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Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper derives an empirical method to identify based on publicly available 
company data different types of training strategies of companies.  
Design/methodology/approach: Using a 10 year panel, we analyse the within-firm retention 
rate, defined as the average proportion of apprentices staying in a company in relation to all 
apprenticeship graduates of a company over several years. The within-firm retention rate is 
used to identify these companies’ training strategies. 
Findings: We show that the company’s motivation for apprenticeship training in Germany is 
not homogeneous: 19 percent of all companies follow a substitution strategy and 44 percent 
follow an investment strategy. We estimate the determinants of the substitution strategy and 
find for example sizeable differences between sectors with different skill requirements and 
between firms’ coverage of industrial relations. 
Research limitations/implications: This method is well suited to classify substitution moti-
vated training firms but it is less precise in identifying the investment motivation. Moreover, 
very small firms which train only one apprentice need longer panel duration for precise re-
sults and therefore our classification results are less precise for very small firms. 
Practical implications: The classification can be used to identify determinants of company 
participation in apprenticeship training and to predict changes in demand for apprentices.  
Originality/value: We derive a simple and innovative method to identify different types of 
training motivation with publicly available company data, which was so far only possible 
with very detailed company specific apprenticeship surveys. 
Key words: Apprenticeship Training, Training Motivations, Human Capital Investments, 
Substitution Effects 
Paper type: Research paper 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The apprenticeship system in Germany is generally considered to be a company investment in 
human capital. This common belief is mainly based on the results of the German cost-benefit 
studies of the BIBB (for latest results cf. Beicht et al. 2004), which estimated that almost all 
companies have sizeable net costs of apprenticeship training. [1] Since apprenticeships are 
unanimously considered to offer general skills these findings have motivated many research-
ers to study the role of market imperfections as an incentive for the training decision of com-
panies (Franz and Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998/9, Dustmann and Schönberg 
2004, Kessler and Lülfelsmann 2006). Based on these theoretical discussions, the German 
apprenticeship system is often used as the institutional setting for empirical investigations of 
company sponsored general training (Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 
Dustmann and Schönberg 2004). These empirical studies implicitly assume that all German 
firms which train apprentices invest in human capital but none of these studies actually 
checks this fact. However, in addition to an investment view, Lindley (1975) already argues 
that there may be a second motivation for apprenticeship training, namely a production or 
substitution strategy. He describes apprentices as productive workers who are used as cheap 
substitutes for unskilled or semiskilled workers. The substitution motivation states that the 
productivity of apprentices (who are used as regular production workers) is higher than their 
training costs and that the unit labour costs of apprentices are lower than the unit labour costs 
of other (unskilled) employees whom they substitute. 
So the first aim of our paper is to study whether the German apprenticeship system is 
indeed homogeneously a human capital investment of the companies. We develop an alterna-
tive method which can be used with publicly available company data to identify the two train-
ing strategies of firms. We argue that a sufficient condition to distinguish between the two 
training strategies is the within firm retention rate over several years, defined as the average 
proportion of apprentices staying in the company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of 
a company over several years. If an engagement in apprenticeship training is supposed to be 
an investment in human capital that earns long term returns for the company, such earnings 
are clearly only possible if a sufficient number of apprentices stays in the company after they 
have finished their apprenticeship (see the integrated model of Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). 
In contrast, a substitution strategy does not require that apprenticeship graduates stay within 
the training company because offering apprenticeships is driven by the unit labour costs of 
apprentices in comparison to suitable substitutes. If apprentices are indeed used as cheap 
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workers during the apprenticeship it can to the contrary be expected that they are too expen-
sive after their apprenticeship, meaning that retaining apprentices is rather the exception than 
the rule. If we look at the long-term within-firm retention rate we find a strong clustering on 
both extremes of the distribution. Overall, 18.5 percent of the companies nearly never hire 
their own apprenticeship graduates, while 43.75 percent of the companies hire almost all of 
their own apprenticeship graduates. We argue that companies which never hire their appren-
ticeship graduates can be clearly assigned to the substitution strategy and that companies 
which hire almost all of their graduates can clearly be assigned to the investment strategy. 
Based on this classification method we find evidence for a non negligible share of companies 
with a substitution strategy (around 18.5 percent of all training companies). This result is in 
contrast to the widely accepted stylized fact of a pure investment strategy of German firms.  
In a second step, we show the reliability of our classification method by comparing it 
with descriptive results of the most recent German cost benefit study. In a third step, we study 
the determinants of companies using a substitution strategy. We first find that the probability 
of the substitution strategy increases with lower capital equipment, with the absence of works 
councils and with a higher share of white collar workers as well as in smaller firms. We fur-
ther find that service sector firms have a significantly higher probability to follow a substitu-
tion strategy than manufacturing firms. Finally, we found complementarities between firms’ 
investments in apprenticeship training and firm sponsored continuing training. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a short literature review (section II), impor-
tant institutional settings are introduced and the within firm retention rate is defined. Then, 
the company training strategies are verified by a comparison with the cost-benefit studies 
(section III). Afterwards, we estimate determinants of a substitution training strategy (section 
IV) and conclude with theoretical and policy implications (section V). 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Beicht et al. (2004) 96 percent of the training companies incur on average net 
costs during the apprenticeships [2]. They conclude that the investment strategy clearly domi-
nates while the substitution strategy can only be found on the fringes. This stylised fact has 
motivated many researchers to study the role of market imperfections as a source of the in-
vestment of German companies in apprenticeships that provide general skills (Franz and 
Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998/9, Dustmann and Schönberg 2004, Kessler and 
Lülfelsmann 2006). The theoretical models explain the incentive of companies to invest in 
apprenticeships through asymmetric information (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), complemen-
tarities between general and specific human capital (Franz and Soskice 1995, Kessler and 
Lülfesmann 2006) or labour market institutions such as unions (Dustmann and Schönberg 
2004). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) integrate different theoretical models in one general 
framework. In contrast to the frequently modelled investment strategy, the substitution strat-
egy is mostly intuitively introduced. The substitution strategy can be analysed by a simple 
microeconomic production model with two substitutable input factors (e.g. apprentices and 
unskilled workers) in which employment is only dependent on the relative unit labour costs 
(substitution of two input factors). However, Lindley (1975) studied this strategy in a more 
complex and formal analytical framework. 
According to the theoretical discussions the German apprenticeship system is used as 
the institutional setting for empirical investigations of company sponsored general training 
(Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Dustmann and Schönberg 2004), but 
the assumption of positive net costs are not been tested. Some of these empirical studies how-
ever stress that apprenticeship training strategies are not unique across sectors and firm sizes 
(Soskice 1994, Franz and Soskice 1995 or Neubäumer and Bellmann 1999). For example, an 
increasing training incidence by firm size is explained by the presence of internal labour mar-
kets in larger firms. A first doubt on the overwhelming dominance of net cost argument in 
Germany occurs by the Swiss cost benefit study of Wolter et al. (2006). They find that only 
one half of the larger firms and one third of the smaller firms incur net costs during the ap-
prenticeship. The huge differences are somewhat surprising because of the similarity of both 
training systems. However, Dionisius et al. (2008) show that a part of the difference can be 
explained by a higher share of productive tasks allocated to apprentices in Switzerland and 
the differences in comparatively lower apprentice to skilled worker wages. Finally, Zwick 
(2007) estimates the contribution of changes in the proportion of apprentices on changes in 
firm performance in Germany. He found an insignificant and not a negative effect of the 
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share of apprentices on productivity which would be expected in a pure investment strategy. 
He concludes that the investment and the substitution strategy may outweigh each other on 
average and that the cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004) might underestimate the substi-
tution strategy. 
However, most of the cited theoretical and empirical studies fail to discuss explicitly 
the retention rate of apprenticeship graduates as a necessary precondition for a return on in-
vestment. One exception is the theoretical model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) in which 
the retention rate is seen as an important training incentive. Empirical studies on the retention 
rates in Germany focus only on the individual rather than on the company. These studies es-
timate the effect of mobility of apprenticeship graduates on wages or duration of the first job 
after apprenticeship (see Euwals and Winkelmann 2004 for a discussion). There are also a 
few studies investigating different sectoral retention rates e.g. by Schwerdt and Bender (2003) 
who estimate the probability of an employer changing of apprenticeship graduates and Büchel 
and Neubäumer (2001) who estimate the determinants of an employment in the training oc-
cupation for apprenticeship graduates. For Switzerland, Wolter and Schweri (2002) analyse 
the retention rate more in depth and show that the strategy of retaining apprenticeship gradu-
ates immediately after training depends substantially on the benefits derived after the appren-
ticeship but less on firms’ net costs during the training period. Furthermore, they find that 
firms which employ their apprenticeship graduates three years after graduation have heavily 
invested during the apprenticeship. However, to the best of our knowledge there is so far no 
empirical analysis based on German company data and studying the relation of retention rates 
and apprenticeship training on company level  [3].  
 
III WITHIN FIRM RETENTION RATE AS AN INDICATOR FOR FIRMS’ TRAIN-
ING STRATEGIES 
We argue that a sufficient condition to distinguish between the two training strategies, in-
vestment or substitution motive, is the within firm retention rate which is defined as the pro-
portion of apprentices staying in the company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of a 
company. If a firm’s engagement in apprenticeship training is supposed to be an investment 
in human capital, such earnings are clearly only possible if a sufficient number of apprentices 
stays in the company after they have finished their apprenticeship (see the integrated model of 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1999) [4]. Consequently, if companies were to follow an investment 
strategy a minimum number of retained apprentices would be a necessary precondition be-
cause without any apprentice staying at the company positive returns on investment are not 
Uncorrected Page Proofs 
 
 
 
possible. In contrast, a substitution strategy does not require that apprenticeship graduates 
stay within the company to make it economically successful because under a substitution 
strategy offering apprenticeships is driven by the cheap labour costs of apprentices in com-
parison to their productivity during the training period. If apprentices are indeed used as 
cheap labour it can be expected - contrary to what was expected above - that after the appren-
ticeship is finished the same person is too expensive in comparison to its productivity, mean-
ing that retaining apprentices is rather the exception than the rule. So if the retention rate is 
always zero this can be assumed to be a reliable indicator for a substitution strategy. 
However, in order to reliably discriminate between companies following an invest-
ment or a substitution strategy, one additional condition has to be met. Since apprentices are 
always employed under fixed-term contracts (which are terminated at the end of the appren-
ticeship programme), apprentices themselves may decide not to stay in the company, meaning 
that not all apprentices are necessarily staying in the company even if a company with an in-
vestment motive would want them to stay. Instead, some of the apprentices may as well de-
cide to leave the training firm after their apprenticeship. To account for this problem we look 
at the retention rate over several years to get a more reliable identification strategy for a com-
pany’s training motive. We argue that if a company which invests in apprenticeship training 
over several years cannot attract a substantial share of their apprenticeship graduates to stay 
in the firm, it is requested to withdraw from apprenticeship training because otherwise it 
keeps having negative instead of positive returns to their investment. So even if we are not 
able to discriminate between contract terminations induced by the firm or by the apprentice, it 
still helps to single out firms following a substitution motive because a positive within firm 
retention rate over several years is a precondition for positive returns to the investment. Thus 
the within firm retention rate helps us to empirically distinguish between the two training 
strategies. 
In order to do so we calculate the average yearly retention rate of apprenticeship 
graduates based on the waves 1996 – 2005 of the IAB Establishment Panel. This representa-
tive survey collects yearly information about the number of apprentices, graduates and stayers 
and a large number of general firm characteristics (see Kölling 2000). The retention rates 
immediately after completion of the apprenticeship is relatively stable and vary between 60 
and 67 percent, corresponding to Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) or Franz and Zimmermann 
(2002) [5]. So in the short run only about one third of apprenticeship graduates leave the 
training firm.  
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However, the yearly mean of the retention rate is a result of a strong clustering on both 
extremes of the retention rate distribution (see figure 1 panel A) which shows that on the left 
end of the distribution nearly 21 percent of all companies do not hire their own apprentices 
and on the right end of the distribution almost 45 percent of the companies hire all of their 
apprenticeship graduates. The strong clustering of the retention rate distribution is similar in 
every year. However, to identify the training motive of one particular company we need the 
retention rate of a particular firm over a minimum number of years and we name this the 
within firm retention rate and study it over several years (for all training firms for whom we 
observe graduates in at least three years; see figure 1 panel B for the 2003 distribution) [6]. 
The distribution of the within firm retention rate over all firms shows a similarly strong clus-
tering on both extremes of the distribution. Companies on the left end of the distribution in 
panel B of figure 1 never hire their own graduates over several years. At minimum, these 14 
percent of all training companies can definitely not follow an investment strategy because 
they have no possibility of gaining returns after the investment period, i.e. after the appren-
ticeship termination. Thus the benefits have to be extracted during the apprenticeship period. 
In contrast, the companies on the right end of the distribution (25 percent) retain all their ap-
prentices, clearly indicating that it pays to keep apprentices as skilled workers after they fin-
ish their apprenticeship. 
 
Figure 1: The pooled cross section retention rate and the within firm retention rate of appren-
ticeship graduates in the year 2003. 
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Source: IAB Establishment Panel, companies in 2003, N= 2697, the within firm retention rate is based on 
own calculation of the waves 1996 – 2005. 
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For a structural comparison of our results with results from earlier studies, namely 
Beicht et al. (2004), we use the following definition for a substitution or an investment strat-
egy based on the distribution of within firm retentions: We define a firm to follow a substitu-
tion strategy, if the within firm retention rate is lower than 20 percent (these are firms on the 
far left end of the distribution in figure 1 panel B). We define a firm to follow an investment 
training strategy if the within firm retention rate is higher than 80 percent over three years 
(these are the firms on the far right end in figure 1 panel B). These somewhat broader defini-
tion criteria have as another advantage that they also include companies which diverge 
slightly from their general retention policy due to an unexpected mismatch between the ap-
prentices and the firm. According to this classification 18.5 percent of the companies’ follow 
a substitution strategy and 43.75 percent follow an investment strategy [7]. 
Although the low data requirements make this classification very attractive, we have 
to keep in mind the underlying assumptions when interpreting the results. First, firms with a 
clear strategy may have to change their ex-ante strategy for example due to a deteriorated 
economic situation which accordingly to our classification strategy would result in a classifi-
cation into the undetermined category. This bias can occur in both training strategies; there-
fore both numbers have to be considered as a lower bound. [8] A second limitation arises be-
cause training companies with only one apprentice require a longer observation period to be 
classified adequately. For example, a small company with only one apprentice can only be 
classified, if we observe at least three graduations during a 10 year period, for example in 
1998, 2001 and 2004. This may lead to a lower share of small firms in the classification sam-
ple than in the whole population. Thus, training strategies are less precisely identified for 
small companies, i.e. the margin of error is larger. Third, firms with an investment strategy 
may also be misclassified if the firm purposefully decides to train more apprentices than re-
quired because they use the apprenticeship as a screening period as well. This would underes-
timate the investment strategy. 
A comparison of our classification of the training motivation is very similar with what 
has been found in the cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004). They study distinguishes be-
tween the “full cost account”, which is supposed to provide a lower bound, and the “variable 
cost account” which is supposed to provide an upper bound of the substitution strategy (see 
Beicht et al. for a discussion). Figures 2 shows that the substitution strategy decreases by firm 
size according to the variable cost approach (dark bars) as well as according to our within 
firm retention rate classification (striped bars). In contrast, the full cost approach does not 
show a decreasing substitution strategy by firm size (light bars). We also find that our ap-
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proach always lies between the calculated lower and upper bound of the cost benefit study, 
which indicates that our results provide an adequate classification despite its simple method 
and comparatively low data requirements. The strong firm-size related decrease in the propor-
tion of firms with a substitution strategy can be assumed to reflect the importance of internal 
labour markets in larger firms (Soskice 1994, Neubäumer and Bellmann 1999), differences in 
the training occupations or differences in collective agreements containing an obligation to 
hire firm internal apprenticeship graduates.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of the substitution strategy by firm size between the within firm retention 
rates and the cost benefit analyses of Beicht et al. (2004) 
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The data are provided by Günter Walden basing on the study of Beicht et al. (2004). The within firm re-
tention rate is based on the IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
IV DETERMINANTS OF A SUBSTITUTION TRAINING STRATEGY 
In the following paragraph we use our classification to study what determines whether a firm 
follows a substitution or an investment strategy with its apprenticeship training. We estimate 
the determinants of the substitution strategy in the year 2003 for which we have most obser-
vations (results however remain stable if we use other years or vary the cut off points in the 
classification step; detailed results for alternative estimations are given in the appendix). 
The results of the 2003 regression analysis based on the above mentioned cut-off defi-
nition firstly show an increasing probability of a substitution strategy with a larger proportion 
of white-collar workers in comparison to the reference group of unskilled blue-collar workers 
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[10]. This can be interpreted as a consequence of typical internal labour market characteris-
tics. Internal labour market studies show that for blue-collar workers internal labour markets 
are much stronger, leading to a longer tenure and a higher probability of company sponsored 
general training, whereas for white collar workers internal labour markets are less strong and 
therefore firm sponsored general training should be lower (Janssen and Pfeiffer 2007). Inter-
nal labour markets also explain why larger firms are less likely to train with a substitution 
strategy: with increasing firm size the probability of internal labour markets rises and, there-
fore, the apprenticeships as an important port of entry into the internal labour market are more 
likely [11]. This is in line with the argument of Soskice (1994) who describes the role of in-
ternal labour markets as central for the apprenticeship system, because it helps large and me-
dium-sized companies to retain their apprentices and it provides young people with a strong 
incentive to strive for an apprenticeship in those companies. Larger firms can therefore attract 
more able adolescents, as theoretically shown by Franz and Soskice (1995). The higher im-
mediate retention rate allows larger firms to invest in more expansive training. 
 
Table 1: Marginal Effects of a Probit Regression. 
Dependent dummy variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 Coefficient Z-Value  Coefficient Z-Value
Share of White Collar Worker 0.0939 1.62  0.0973 1.69
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 0.0437 0.73  0.0427 0.72
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0008 1.23  -0.0008 1.32
Labour Turnover 0.0430 0.29  0.0461 0.32
Log(Investment) -0.0098 3.59  -0.0095 3.50
Works Council* -0.0637 2.49  0.0060 0.17
Collective Bargaining Contract* 0.0286 1.25  0.0668 2.46
Interaction W' Council Collective B' Contract*    -0.1059 2.42
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0107 0.41  -0.0128 0.50
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0647 1.80  -0.0569 1.57
Workforce Development in the Last Year -0.0005 1.31  -0.0005 1.28
Company Sponsored Further Training* -0.0759 2.01  -0.0766 2.02
Located in East Germany* -0.2226 4.11  -0.2256 4.19
Firm Size -0.0002 2.53  -0.0002 2.46
Firm Size Square/ 1000000 0.0103 2.89  0.0099 2.84
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0330 5.81   0.0337 5.93
Number of Observations  1357   1357
Pseudo R²  0.2504   0.2546
log Likelihood  -533.53  -530.5884
* Dummy variable; the regression include 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly sig-
nificant, while the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share of 
unskilled blue collar workers. Source: own calculations with the IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on classi-
fication on the waves 1996-2005. 
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Thirdly, we find that service sector firms are significantly more likely to follow a sub-
stitution strategy than manufacturing firms meaning they retain on average significantly fewer 
apprentices over several years. This corresponds with a lower importance of internal labour 
markets in service sector firms (Janssen und Pfeiffer 2007) and that these firms require more 
general skills (Smits and Zwick 2004). This can theoretically be explained by the skill 
weights approach of Lazear (2003) who shows that more general bundles of skills lead to a 
higher probability of an external job offer (see also Geel et al. 2008). This causes a higher 
mobility of apprenticeship graduates in the service sector as a result of their more general 
combination of skills. [12] Basing on the skill weights approach, Geel et al. (2008) show that 
a higher mobility of apprenticeship graduates correspond with a more general combination of 
skills. Therefore, service sector firms are more likely requested to ensure cost neutral appren-
ticeship training and their apprentices have to be more productive during the apprenticeship 
than apprentices in other sectors where the combination of acquired skills is more specific. 
Evidence for a higher productivity of service sector apprentices is provided by Mohrenweiser 
and Zwick (2008) based on six years social security panel data study. They find a higher pro-
ductivity of apprentices in commercial and trade occupations in comparison to manufacturing 
apprentices. Thus, if the service sector becomes more important in the future, this could result 
in an increasing importance of the substitution strategy if nothing else changes.  
Fourthly, we find that a firm’s coverage by a collective bargaining agreement results 
in a higher (but insignificant) probability of a substitution strategy whilst a firm with a works 
council have a significant lower probability of a substitution strategy. This is in line with the 
argument that works councils raises company sponsored training expenditures using their co-
determination rights on personnel matters especially the skill development (Müller-Jentsch 
1995). These co-determination rights may be used to negotiate with the business management 
about an obligatory employment contract of apprenticeship graduates leading to a higher re-
tention rate and this result in to a declining probability of the substitution strategy. This de-
scribes theoretically the voice function of employee representation which is widely associated 
with works councils operating on the company level whereas collective bargaining takes 
place mostly on the industry level and it is carried out by trade unions. Indeed, the interaction 
between works councils and collective bargaining is pronounced as the important link to un-
derstand the German system of industrial relation because works councils are more beneficial 
if the company is covered by a collective bargaining contract meaning that the distributional 
conflicts are delegated to the industry level (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Interestingly, an inter-
action term (works council and collective bargaining) enforces the pure collective bargaining 
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effect which results now in a significant higher probability of the substitution strategy. This 
can be interpreted that if a company faces a collective bargaining contract which can be asso-
ciated with a binding minimum wage (here especial for unskilled workers) but not a works 
council it uses apprentices as substitutes for unskilled workers, i.e. they do not retain their 
apprenticeship graduates. Otherwise, the works council itself has no effect on the training 
strategy as long as the company is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement which 
means that the distributional conflicts are not delegated to the industry level. Indeed, the cov-
erage of a works council and a collective bargaining contract decrease the probability of a 
substitution strategy (interaction effect). Here, the distributional conflicts are negotiated on 
the industry level and the works council may now use the co-determination rights to negotiate 
a job offer for apprenticeship graduates and this changes the role of apprentices within a 
company fundamentally. These findings support the argument of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), 
who state that the interaction between works councils and collective bargaining is as funda-
mental as the firm size in explaining the German system of industrial relations. 
Moreover, a higher capital equipment per employee leads to a lower probability of a 
substitution strategy indicating complementarities between physical and human capital (Franz 
and Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). Another interesting result is that a higher 
export share which is a common measure for a firms’ competitiveness does not lead to a 
lower probability of a substitution strategy. This indicates that a stronger competitive envi-
ronment is obviously not an obstacle for training investments. Interestingly, foreign owned 
firms are also not more likely to follow a substitution strategy. Although, foreign owned firms 
have a lower probability to train apprentices, those firms obviously do not train to substitute 
unskilled workers with low wage apprentices. Finally, the negative relation between invest-
ment in further training and a substitution training strategy indicates complementarities be-
tween initial and further training expenditures. Additionally, we have controlled for changes 
in labour demand by taking into account the workforce development in the last year and the 
regional unemployment rate. The first makes sure that hiring of a company’s own apprentice-
ship graduates is not a pure question of a rising labour demand. The latter controls for re-
gional labour market differences.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
Apprenticeship training in Germany is typically seen as an investment of companies into the 
human capital of their apprentices in many theoretical and empirical studies over the last dec-
ades. This view is based on the German cost benefit studies which provide evidence for sub-
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stantial net costs for firms training apprentices. However, this assumption has not been recon-
firmed by other types of data or methods so far. We show that apprenticeship training firms 
does not follow one homogeneous strategy. Rather, some firms follow an investment strategy 
and others follow a substitution strategy. We suggest an empirical method based on a detailed 
analysis of retention rates to distinguish between both strategies. According to our classifica-
tion, we find 18.5 percent of all companies to follow a substitution strategy and 43.75 percent 
to follow an investment strategy; the rest is mixed or undetermined. We can further show that 
our classification method is in line with structural features of the available cost benefit stud-
ies; the within firm retention rate distribution is located between the full and the variable cost 
account estimates of Beicht et al. (2004). The classification based on within-firm retention 
rates is attractive because it is applicable in public available databases. It is well suited to 
classify substitution motivated training firms but it is less precise in identifying the invest-
ment motivation. Moreover, very small firms which train only one apprentice need longer 
panel duration and therefore classification results are less precise for very small firms. 
In a third step we estimate which firm characteristics determine a substitution strategy 
as defined above. We find that the probability of a firm following a substitution strategy in-
creases with lower capital equipment, with the absence of works council, with a higher share 
of white collar workers and in smaller companies. We further find that service sector firms 
have a significantly higher probability to follow a substitution strategy than manufacturing 
firms and complementarities between firms’ investments in initial training and firm sponsored 
continuing training. 
Our findings complement previous empirical analyses. Previous studies about the train-
ing motivation require cost benefit data but this data can not be linked to other data sets and 
lack a panel dimension by construction. The within-firm retention rate allows now a suitable 
approximation of the training motivation in Social Security Records and the IAB Establish-
ment Panel. The training motivation is political and scientific important because companies 
with a substitution strategy employ apprentices because of their lower unit labour costs and, 
thus, they react strongly to relative wages of apprentices. Their decisions may be in sharp 
contrast to the decisions taken by firms training apprentices according to an investment strat-
egy because the latter care more about future returns and training quality rather than lower 
wages of apprentices. Thus we conclude that a sound analysis of apprenticeship training and 
its determinants firstly needs to distinguish firms training according to an investment or a 
substitution strategy. This classification can further be used to test theories about company 
sponsored general training. 
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ENDNOTES: 
1. This refers to the full cost account which is usually cited in scientific papers. 
2. The cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004) comprises two estimations. Here, we report only the full cost 
approach, because this is always cited in scientific publication. Both approaches are shown in section four. 
3. The German cost benefit studies use three year average retention rate to estimate the benefits of the appren-
tices training, but they do not report the rates. 
4. In the investment strategy the investment period is defined as the training period and the return period is 
defined as the employment of own apprenticeship graduates. 
5. The Berufsbildungsbericht as well as the study of Schwerdt and Bender (2003) use the weighted retention 
rates, whereby the weight is the inverse of the sample probability to the IAB Establishment Panel. The 
weighting leads to a 10 percent lower retention rate on average. 
6. The retention rate distribution remains stable if we extent the minimal observation of graduates to 4 and 5 
years but the number of observations naturally decreases (see appendix). This especially occurs in small 
firms which train only one apprentice. 
7. If we vary the training strategy cutting points between 15/85 and 25/75 percent the summary statistics re-
main stable, but logical, there changes the number of companies. All following results are additionally cal-
culated for different cut off points, which are shown in the appendix. 
8. In around 4 percent of the companies, we observe that no apprenticeship graduate is hired in one year and 
all graduates are hired in all other years. The other way around is observed in around 1.5 percent of the 
firms. 
9. Similar clusters are observed on factors of four and five in the respective histograms in the appendix. 
10. Apprentices are not counted as employees. 
11. We modelled a continuous concave function of the firm size, but the maximum lies outside the observed 
firm size distribution. 
12. This paper analyses the mobility based on the companies view. Similar results of sectoral different mobility 
on an individual perspective are shown by Schwerdt and Bender (2003) or Franz and Zimmermann (2002). 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Figure A1. Within firm retention rate distribution of apprenticeship graduates by 
minimum observations increase: 
Minimum Observation: 4, (N=2027) Minimum Observation: 5, (N=1505) 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics, all classified companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Proportion of Substitution strategy firms 1357 0.2181 0.4131 0 1 
Share of White Collar Worker 1357 0.4383 0.2880 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 1357 0.3987 0.2899 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 1357 17.88 25.49 0 100 
Labour Turnover 1357 0.0245 0.0544 0 0.8913
Log(Investment) 1357 6.5903 3.5041 0 14.72 
Works Council* 1357 0.6308 0.4828 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 1357 0.6787 0.4671 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 1357 0.5195 0.4998 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 1357 0.1496 0.3568 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 1357 0.1120 0.3155 0 1 
 Workforce Development in the Last Year 1357 -4.46 47.96 -701 445 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 1357 0.9285 0.2577 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 1357 0.3589 0.4798 0 1 
Firm Size 1357 379.16 1075.49 1 19443
Regional Unemployment Rate 1357 13.19 5.45 6.9 21.8 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics, substitution strategy companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Share of White Collar Worker 296 0.5064 0.3277 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 296 0.3799 0.3277 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 296 5.09 15.53 0 100 
Labour Turnover 296 0.0329 0.0700 0 0.5714
Log(Investment) 296 4.9113 3.8336 0 12.44 
Works Council* 296 0.3716 0.4841 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 296 0.5912 0.4924 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 296 0.2838 0.4516 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 296 0.2264 0.4192 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 296 0.0332 0.1795 0 1 
 Workforce Development in the Last Year 296 -3.86 53.83 -701 350 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 296 0.8412 0.3661 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 296 0.5270 0.5001 0 1 
Firm Size 296 123.53 770.52 1 13080
Regional Unemployment Rate 296 15.58 5.51 6.9 21.8 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics, investment strategy companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Share of White Collar Worker 1061 0.4193 0.2731 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 1061 0.4040 0.2784 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 1061 21.45 26.56 0 100 
Labour Turnover 1061 0.0222 0.0489 0 0.8913
Log(Investment) 1061 7.0587 3.2574 0 14.72 
Works Council* 1061 0.7031 0.4571 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 1061 0.7031 0.4571 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 1061 0.5853 0.4929 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 1061 0.1282 0.3344 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 1061 0.1338 0.3406 0 1 
Workforce Development in the Last Year 1061 -4.63 46.21 -323 445 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 1061 0.9529 0.2120 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 1061 0.3120 0.4635 0 1 
Firm Size 1061 450.47 1136.27 2 19443
Regional Unemployment Rate 1061 12.52 5.24 6.9 21.8 
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Table A4: Marginal Effects of Probit Regression in different years, with the same cut off 
point 20/80, the 2003 regression is reported in the text. 
Dependent dummy variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 2001: 20/80 2003: 20/80  2005: 20/80 
 Coefficient Z 
Coeffi-
cient Z  
Coeffi-
cient Z 
Share of White Collar Worker 0.1346 2.34 0.0973 1.69  0.0885 1.33
Share of Skilled Blue Collar 
Worker 0.0927 1.63 0.0427 0.72  0.0478 0.71
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0018 2.34 -0.0008 1.32  -0.0008 1.26
Labour Turnover -0.0347 0.24 0.0461 0.32  0.0860 0.52
Log(Investment) -0.0111 3.37 -0.0095 3.50  -0.0103 3.48
Works Council* -0.0170 0.45 0.0060 0.17  -0.0183 0.49
Collective Bargaining 
Contract* 0.0617 2.31 0.0668 2.46  0.0558 2.02
Interaction W' Council  
Collective B' Contract* -0.1139 2.49 -0.1059 2.42  -0.0657 1.44
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0227 0.83 -0.0128 0.50  -0.0134 0.51
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0338 0.89 -0.0569 1.57  -0.0648 1.76
Workforce Development in the 
Last Year -0.0001 0.66 -0.0005 1.28  0.0004 1.10
Company Sponsored Further 
Training* -0.0675 1.98 -0.0766 2.02  -0.0357 0.98
Located in East Germany* -0.1235 2.22 -0.2256 4.19  -0.0965 2.16
Firm Size / 10 -0.0002 0.40 -0.0017 2.46  -0.0027 3.68
Firm Size Square/ 1000000 0.0004 0.44 0.0099 2.84  0.0202 4.01
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0205 3.84 0.0337 5.93  0.0196 3.98
Number of Observations  1341  1357   1045
Pseudo R²  0.2101  0.2546   0.2656
log Likelihood -532.01 -530.5884  -405.42004
* Dummy variable; including 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly significant, while 
the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share of unskilled blue 
collar workers. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on classification on the waves 1996-2005, own 
calculations. 
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Table A5: Marginal Effects of Probit Regression with different cut off points in 2003, 
the 20/80 regression is reported in the text. 
Dependent dummy variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 2003: 15/85 2003: 20/80  2003: 25/75 
 Coefficient Z 
Coeffi-
cient Z  Coefficient Z 
Share of White Collar Worker 0.0513 1.29 0.0973 1.69  0.0738 1.33
Share of Skilled Blue Collar 
Worker -0.0130 0.32 0.0427 0.72  0.0052 0.09
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0005 1.16 -0.0008 1.32  -0.0008 1.37
Labour Turnover 0.0118 0.12 0.0461 0.32  0.0784 0.53
Log(Investment) -0.0068 3.49 -0.0095 3.50  -0.0100 3.85
Works Council* 0.0267 1.12 0.0060 0.17  0.0122 0.37
Collective Bargaining  
Contract* 0.0462 2.55 0.0668 2.46  0.0477 1.77
Interaction W' Council  
Collective B' Contract* -0.0705 2.24 -0.1059 2.42  -0.0899 2.19
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0075 0.44 -0.0128 0.50  -0.0114 0.45
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0405 1.58 -0.0569 1.57  -0.0489 1.40
Workforce Development in the 
Last Year 0.0001 0.18 -0.0005 1.28  -0.0006 1.47
Company Sponsored Further 
Training* -0.0372 1.39 -0.0766 2.02  -0.1044 2.73
Located in East Germany* -0.1584 4.16 -0.2256 4.19  -0.1890 3.51
Firm Size -0.0003 3.35 -0.0002 2.46  -0.0002 2.79
Firm Size Square/ 10000 0.0128 3.36 0.0099 2.84  0.0124 3.17
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0243 5.97 0.0337 5.93  0.0290 5.32
Number of Observations  1106  1357   1521
Pseudo R²  0.3086  0.2546   0.2395
log Likelihood -379.57 -530.5884  -620.26407
* Dummy variable; including 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly significant, while 
the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share of unskilled blue 
collar workers. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on classification on the waves 1996-2005, own 
calculations. 
 
